Shifts in Policy and Power: Calculating the Consequences of Increased Prosecutorial Power and Reduced Judicial Authority in Post 9/11 America by McNeil, Chris
Page 1 of  15
Shifts in Policy and Power: Calculating the Consequences of Increased 
Prosecutorial Power and Reduced Judicial Authority in Post 9/11 America
by Christopher B. McNeil
© 2005 Christopher B. McNeil
Introduction
When Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act shortly after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, it responded to a call for increased executive authority in the fight against 
threats to our national security. The consequences of this legislative action are still being 
assessed, but one thing appears clear: as a nation and by this legislation, we sought to enhance 
executive authority to prevent further threats to public safety in the United States. The means by 
which Congress sought to address such threats includes an enhanced prosecutorial authority to 
act, frequently out of the public’s view, in derogation of traditional notions of individual liberty 
and privacy, and beyond the reach of officers of the judicial branch. 
Among the uncertainties engendered by the legislative reaction to 9/11 is the broad 
question of the consequences of shifting power from the judicial branch to the executive branch 
of government. What are the consequences, for example, of authorizing warrantless arrests based 
on suspicion of an immigration status violation, or of authorizing the Attorney General to detain 
any noncitizen whom the Attorney General has certified as a spy or terrorist? When the judicial 
branch cedes to the executive branch its authority to evaluate in advance of arrest the merits of a 
proposed criminal detention or prosecution, and when lawmakers invest more heavily in the 
prosecutorial offices than in the judiciary, what results can be predicted?
While these may be untested waters, given the calamity and extraordinary character of 
the events that spawned this shift in power, there are bases upon which some predictions might 
reasonably be founded. There is evidence already available to us that might shed light on the 
implications of this shift, evidence that might suggest the scope of the dangers we invite by 
divesting our courts of powers traditionally held in the judicial branch of government. It is the 
thesis central to this article that certain predictions can be made based on well-established data 
and reason, about the consequences of shifting power from the judiciary to the executive and its 
prosecutorial functions. These predictions flow from research and reasoning drawn from another 
institution that relies heavily on balancing the roles of prosecutor and the judiciary: criminal 
sentencing.  For it is in the area of criminal sentencing that we have been witnesses to a 
substantial loss of judicial power, power that has been diverted from the court to the prosecutor 
and in some instances coopted by the electorate or specific classes of unelected persons, so that 
the power is both nonresponsive to the rule of law and wholly unaccountable. 
The theory, then, behind this thesis is that we have a substantial body of research and 
analysis illuminating both the causes and the effects of shifting power from the judicial branch 
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and to the executive branch (through its prosecutor).  Legislation that deprives courts of 
discretion at the time of sentencing, through sentencing commissions and mandatory minimum 
sentences, offers a concrete example of such a shift in power. The beneficiaries of this shift –
prosecutors who are freed from the vagaries of sentencing discretion exercised by judges – can 
provide an evidentiary basis for making predictions for what happens when the executive branch 
is given unbridled and unchecked authority and the judicial branch is in equal measure deprived 
of that authority.  Lessons learned from this shift in power may then be used to inform 
predictions concerning the consequences – intended or otherwise – of shifts in power occasioned 
by legislation inspired by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  
Singularly disturbing about these lessons, I propose, is the consequence that much of the 
criminal justice apparatus concerning pre-warrant detention, currently forced into the light of 
day,  will forever be closed to defense counsel, to the courts, and ultimately to the public. These 
lessons suggest that once authorized to detain without warrant whole new classes of persons, the 
prosecutorial offices will be able to preempt and ultimately negate firmly rooted constitutional 
protections limiting the power of the government to control the liberty of the governed.  Where 
before 9/11 the prosecutor would be required to solicit the support of a judicial officer before 
taking a person into custody, there will be in the absence of such a requirement a fundamental 
shift away from due process as we know it, and in derogation of fundamental human rights.  
Further, I propose that we have a substantial base of knowledge and experience in support of 
these predictions, particularly with respect to use and abuse of power by prosecutors when 
prosecutorial functions are removed from public scrutiny. Drawing from these premises, I 
propose that courts have an affirmative duty to anticipate the unwarranted diminution of 
constitutional and human rights occasioned by this shift of power, and exercise judicial authority 
in a manner designed to preserve those rights.
I. The Done Deal: Post 9/11 Legislation
A. USA Patriot Act
Within eight days of September 11, the Bush Administration and its Attorney General, 
John Ashcroft, proposed what would be known as the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot 
Act), which was signed into law on October 26, 2001.1 Among its many provisions, the Act 
“grants additional wiretapping and surveillance authority to federal law enforcement, removes 
barriers between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, adds financial disclosure and 
reporting requirements to combat terrorist funding, and gives greater authority to the Attorney 
General to detain and deport aliens suspected of having terrorist ties.”2
More specifically within the USA Patriot Act, the Bush Administration sought authority 
to indefinitely detain non-citizens suspected of terrorism, without ever filing charges against the 
suspect.3 Congress resisted this, and the Act as enacted permits unwarranted detention for seven 
days, after which the suspect must be charged.4 But this seven-day limit is not universally 
effective as a check against prosecutorial abuse. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
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Penalty Act of 1996,5 the Attorney General is required to detain and remove aliens convicted of 
certain crimes, and the Court has construed this to provide for indefinite detention of those not 
deportable because their country of origin would not accept them.6 As a result of the USA Patriot 
Act and prior anti-terrorist laws, the Attorney General is given the power “to detain indefinitely 
not only those convicted of crimes or immigration offenses, as under old law, but also any person 
the Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe is a terrorist or ‘is engaged in any other 
activity that endangers the national security of the United States.’  Thus, the USA Patriot Act 
extends the Attorney General’s powers beyond those granted in the 1996 legislation and may 
give the Attorney General unfettered discretion to determine who is a terrorist. Furthermore, 
judicial review of the Attorney General’s decision is only available through habeas corpus 
proceedings.”7
Under the USA Patriot Act, the acts of terrorism to which the Attorney General is given 
such broad powers includes “any group that engages in violence or the destruction of property,” 
presumably including “advocacy groups causing minor property damage during an act of civil 
disobedience,” and is not limited to foreign or international groups.8
B. Immigration: Indefinite Detention under INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. 
287.3
Pursuant to an amendment effective September 17, 2001, 8 C.F.R. section 287.3(d)9, 
permits the Immigration and Naturalization Service to ‘detain individuals indefinitely following 
a warrantless arrest without bringing any charges against them, in times of “emergency or 
extraordinary circumstance.”10 Commentators have expressed three-fold concerns about these 
amendments, arising from constitutional law and public policy: “The amended regulation 
infringes upon Fourth Amendment rights both in the context of immigration law enforcement 
itself and in the Attorney General’s repeated suggestion that immigration law endorsement is 
being used to effectuate criminal law enforcement purposes. The amended rule also violates 
fundamental principles of due process rights by detaining individuals for indefinite periods of 
time without establishing cause. Finally, the rule creates a policy that undermines its purpose by 
simultaneously sweeping up thousands of innocent individuals whose rights effectively have 
been terminated, and creating a sense of fear in communities already reeling from violence 
directed at them by the public.”11
The amended rule repeals the requirement that the INS bring the arrestee in front of an 
examining officer within twenty-four hours and replaces it with a forty-eight hour requirement. 
The amended rule also provides that in the event of ‘an emergency or other extraordinary 
circumstance,” the INS is afforded ‘an additional reasonable period of time” to examine the 
arrestee, and is not subject to any specific time period within which it must perform this 
examination. The amended regulation thus allows immigrants arrested without a warrant to be 
held indefinitely without even the minimal protection of a determination that the INS has prima 
facie evidence of any violation.”12
II. Shifts in Judicial and Executive Power in Modern Penalism
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The shift of power from the judiciary to the executive branch manifested in the USA 
Patriot Act and in the 2001 amendments to 8 C.F.R. 287.3 signal a significant diversion of
oversight away from our courts and in favor of the executive branch. Prosecutorial discretion 
now controls the decision whether to confine suspects who arguably at least meet definitional 
prerequisites, in a process that until now had called for judicial oversight. Such a shift may well 
reflect a determination by lawmakers and by the public at large, that courts are simply incapable 
of responding to threats to our national security in a manner sufficiently tuned and nimble to 
effectively address such threats. Public support may also be attributed to a collective perception 
that any adverse consequence flowing from these legislative initiatives will have an impact only 
upon immigrants and will spare the middle-class electorate. History gives substance to these 
suppositions, particularly if one examines parallels that exist between the public’s reaction to 
post 9/11 terroristic threat with its reaction to rising crime rates in the late 1970s and early to mid 
1980s. 
A. Predicates to the Shift
In his seminal and widely respected work on crime and social order, “The Culture of 
Control,”13  David Garland (Professor of Law and Sociology, New York University School of 
Law) describes what he refers to as the “crisis of modern penalism” as a multifaceted reaction to 
penal welfarism. Drawing from critical examinations of the corrections movement that 
predominated penal practices in the United States between the end of World War II to the 
beginning of the 1970, Garland provides a chronological map of the rise of prosecutorial power 
and the erosion of the judicial role in criminal justice systems. Viewed from the 1960s and early 
1970s, criminal justice and sentencing systems in the United States bore the earmarks often 
associated with social welfare programs. Crime at the time was viewed as “a product of social 
and economic deprivation,” and the public “looked to the state to provide the social reforms and 
welfare support needed to address this social program.”14
During the 1970s and even more so during the Reagan years in the 1980s, this view of 
crime and punishment in America shifted significantly away from a focus on the offender and in 
favor of the victim of crime. Notable in this period were influential reports that directly 
challenged the role courts should play in the criminal justice system, with calls for the repeal of 
indeterminate sentencing laws, restrictions on the use of parole, imposition of fixed term 
sentences geared not towards the offender but based wholly on the offense, and ‘presumptive 
sentencing’ aimed at reducing sentence disparity.15  In the place of rehabilitation, these reports 
pursued an agenda of “retributive justice,” a penological approach that “stressed the moral 
superiority of proportional, backward-looking punishment. . . .”16  As Garland puts it, ‘[f]or the 
first time in decades, and in stark contrast to the prevailing orthodoxy, a prominent work of 
penology argued a general case for retributive punishment as an end in itself.”17   The trend 
charted by Garland revealed the hope that crime would be addressed by “[b]etter, more vigorous 
policing and harsher, more certain punishments. . . more deterrence and control, not welfare.” 18
Concurrent with the demise of correctionalism and the rise of retributive justice in the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980 was a “hardening of social divisions,” as Garland puts it, 
separating by wealth and social position those with jobs and those without. 
The social and economic distance between the jobless and those in 
work, blacks and whites, affluent suburbs and strife-torn inner 
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cities, consumers in a booming private sector and claimants left 
behind in collapsing public institutions grew ever greater in these 
years, until it became a common place of political and social 
commentary. In place of the solidaristic ideals of the Great Society 
of the Welfare State there emerged a deeply divided society –
variously described as the ‘dualized society’, the ‘thirty, thirty, 
forty society,’ the ‘seduced and repressed,’ or, in the USA where 
social divisions were overlaid by racial ones, ‘American 
Apartheid’ – with one sector being disciplined in the name of 
traditional morality.
Garland also notes that by the last third of the twentieth century, society in the United 
States had largely acknowledged the “normality of high crime rates” and the limitations of the 
criminal justice state to do much about those rates.19  This dual realization led to the debunking 
of what Garland refers to as the “myth of the sovereign state and its monopoly of crime 
control.”20  Pervasive crime and a realization that the state is ill-prepared to mitigate such rates of 
crime took a toll on the criminal justice system, and on the political structures that shape the 
system. Governments at all levels in the late 1980s through to the present, have had to 
acknowledge that government alone might promise but cannot deliver effective crime control. At 
the same time, however, the public continues to demand policies that inspire trust and confidence 
in the security of their lives and property.  As Garland explains,
The emergent outcome is a series of policies that appear deeply 
conflicted. . . . On the one hand, there has been an attempt to face 
up to the predicament and develop pragmatic new strategies that 
are adapted to it: through institutional reforms aimed at 
overcoming the limits of the criminal justice state, or else through 
accommodations that recognize these limitations and work within 
them. But alongside these difficult adaptations to the reality 
principle, there is a recurring attempt to evade its terms altogether, 
particularly on the part of elected officials who play an 
increasingly prominent role in criminal justice policy-making. The 
politicized reaction takes two recurring forms. Either it wilfully 
denies the predicament and reasserts the old myth of the sovereign 
state and its plenary power to punish. Or else it abandons reasoned, 
instrumental action and retreats into an expressive mode that we 
might. . . describe as acting out – a mode that is concerned not so 
much with controlling crime as with expressing the anger and 
outrage that crime provokes.21
Courts and lawyers can ill-afford to overlook the threats to civil liberties at stake when 
legislatures engage in the kind of “acting out” described by Garland. And there are lessons to be 
learned by considering past instances where legislative reactions were fueled by a desire to 
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express anger and outrage, at the expense of reasoned, instrumental action. That anger and 
outrage, palpable and unstoppable in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, may well 
have been the dominant driving force for the swift passage of the USA Patriot Act and related 
legislation. It thus stands to reason that many of the concerns Garland raises about modern 
penology may be of value when assessing the impact of the Act on criminal justice systems in 
America.
B. The Role of Extraordinary Events
If, as Garland proposes, lawmakers have recognized the limits of the sovereign state to 
control criminal conduct, and at the same time lawmakers are to be responsive to public demands 
for action to prevent crime or at least punish criminals, then legislative responses to public 
outcries may well have a direct impact on the role of courts in the criminal process. If the public 
is convinced that the state is powerless or less than adequate to meet the threat of crime, it will 
invest less trust and authority in the state and retain more of it for itself. Consider the public 
reaction to the heinous crime that took the life of Polly Klaas. A recidivist offender, released 
from prison after serving less than a full sentence, kidnaps and kills an attractive, suburban, 
white teenage girl, inspiring a national movement towards what became the “three strikes” laws.  
Stark policies of punishment aimed at retribution for its own sake can quickly fill the media 
markets after this kind of sensational and largely anomalous criminal event. As Garland explains, 
“the new political imperative is that victims must be protected; their voices must be heard, their 
memory honoured, their anger expressed, their fears addressed. The naming of criminal laws and 
penal measures for crime victims (Megan’s law, Jenny’s law, Stephanie’s law, and most recently 
the British campaign for Sarah’s law) purports to honour them in this way, though there is 
undoubtedly an element of exploitation here too, as the individual’s name is used to fend off 
objections to measures that are often nothing more than retaliatory legislation passed for public 
display and political advantage.”22   The consequence of such exploitation, Garland argues, is a 
shift of the debate “away from the instrumental reasoning of crime control analysis towards the 
visceral emotions of identification and righteous indignation. Once this shift has been effected, 
the terms of the debate are transformed and ‘facts’ become ‘less persuasive than the moral 
authority of grief.’”23
Yet there is a danger associated accommodating, unquestioningly, the force of such 
momentum. If our nation has responded to the attacks of September 11 by enacting laws that 
shift power from courts to prosecutors, and has done so without a reasoned examination of the 
need for such a shift and in favor of our “visceral emotions,” then consequences both unintended 
and profound may await. We have reason to be cautious, given the consequences of “acting out” 
that can be tied to criminal sentencing reforms like the “three strikes” laws passed after the 
murder of Polly Klaas. 
The “three strikes” laws are useful here because they offer a concrete example of a 
deliberate act by lawmakers – driven by an intensely motivated and agitated public – to divest 
the judicial branch of power and transfer that power to the executive branch through its 
prosecutor. In much the same way, the USA Patriot Act and other anti-terrorist legislation invests 
substantial power and discretion in the prosecutor, preemptive of judicial involvement. The 
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public may well have expressed its desire to enhance a sense of national security – to the extent 
that it even was aware of the details of this legislation during the two months immediately after 
our country was attacked. Even so, however, courts must be wary of legislation that restricts the 
power of the judiciary to act, as experience teaches with the “three-strikes” legislation. 
In his address to members of the American Bar Association during its 2003 annual 
meeting, Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy encouraged members of the legal profession to 
examine criminal justice issues  having to do with sentencing and incarceration.24 Expressly 
citing mandatory minimum sentences, Justice Kennedy urged legal professionals to reevaluate 
the wisdom of penal systems that rely on what he perceived as unduly long sentences and 
sentencing schemes which divest courts of discretion to impose sentences that are suited to the 
diverse goals of incarceration. Among the comments which brought the audience of lawyers and 
judges to their feet in ovation were his very clear and direct challenges to legislation that has led 
to inflated, over-long terms of imprisonment, and that reduce the discretionary power of judges.
A key subtext of Justice Kennedy’s remarks was the proposition that there has been a 
profound and widespread realignment of power away from the judiciary and in favor of the 
executive branch of government. This realignment is most apparent in criminal proceedings at 
both the state and federal levels, and most directly impacts the administration of justice at the 
time of sentencing and throughout the period of incarceration. In a nation that currently 
imprisons more than 1.2 million of its citizens and has the world’s highest per capita prison 
population, Justice Kennedy saw a particular urgency in the need for active involvement by legal 
professionals, involvement that should, in his view, require a reevaluation of sentencing terms 
and most importantly lead to the abolishment of mandatory minimum sentences. 
C. Derogation of Accountability
Although not always transparent, one concrete consequence of legislation aimed at 
responding to atrocities and crimes of extraordinary public interest is the diminution of discretion 
on the part of the governmental actor. The “culture of control” described by Garland is one by 
which public action is aimed increasingly at limiting options for courts when responding to 
criminal conduct. Mandatory minimum sentences, for example, spawned in reaction to the Polly 
Klaas murder, remove from the courts discretion with respect to sentencing the recidivist 
offender. Instead of the elected or appointed judicial officer rendering a reasoned sentence based 
upon the facts presented in open court, the terms of an offender’s sentence is prescribed by 
lawmakers who know nothing about the circumstances of the particular case. Once a prosecutor 
determines to charge an accused offender with a three-strikes law, the court has no choice but to 
impose the enhanced sentence if the accused is convicted, regardless of circumstances in 
mitigation of such a sentence.  While there is some measure of accountability – the prosecutor 
generally is held accountable through the process of public election – the steps leading to a 
prosecutor’s decision to pursue or avoid the enhanced sentence are conducted wholly outside of 
the public view. 
III. Lessons From a Comparative Prosecutorial System: Japan
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In the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, the criminal justice system was quite predictably 
rocked by calls for action. Poised with an almost disquieting prescience was the United States 
Department of Justice and its Attorney General, John Ashcroft, ready almost before the fact, with 
legislation that would materially enhance prosecutorial power and remove judicial oversight in 
the investigation and prosecution of suspected criminal and terroristic conduct.25   Significant 
legislative authority was proposed, by which federal prosecutors would have the power to detain 
suspects without first securing court approval and in some instances without ever needing such 
approval. How significant is this power, and what are the implications on criminal justice 
systems in general? 
Some light can be shed on these questions by considering the prosecutorial culture of 
Japan. Such a comparison might be warranted in part because the Japanese prosecutorial system 
is a relatively unified system, at least when compared to the multi-tiered and multi-jurisdictional 
prosecutorial systems in the United States. Also, much of the prosecutorial system is of relatively 
recent vintage, evolving from reforms put into place by the occupational forces – predominately 
from the United States – following World War II. Further, the comparative prosecutorial systems 
of the United States and Japan have been the subject of careful and well-documented study. 
Inquiries and analyses into Japanese prosecutorial systems, and comparisons of those systems 
with modern prosecutorial practices in the United States, supply a substantial base of knowledge, 
from social scientists in both Japan and the United States.26
Most useful in this comparison, however, is the parallel that may be drawn from where 
Japanese prosecutorial culture is today and how it compares with where prosecutorial systems in 
the United States appear to be heading. In many ways, the procuracy in Japan – its national cadre 
of criminal prosecutors – already enjoy many of the advantages sought by the United States and 
its Attorney General in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11. If post-9/11 legislation 
achieves some of its more prominent goals – including divesting judicial involvement in key pre-
charging criminal processes – then the Japanese model may serve as a valuable resource for 
judges, lawyers, and lawmakers in the United States.
A. Key Differences in Prosecutorial Systems
In “The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan,” (Oxford 2002) David 
Johnson offers a comparison of prosecutorial systems in Japan and the United States. His
analysis is based on participant observation and in-depth, unstructured interviewing over a period 
of approximately one thousand days, primarily in the Japanese cities of Kobe and Tokyo, and 
Alameda County, California.27  Supporting this research with a wide array of data-gathering that 
included examination of court and prosecutorial records, surveys, and reviews of existing 
literature, Johnson brought together the disparate facets of prosecutorial systems in Japan and the 
United States, offering a significant contribution to the body of knowledge about both systems. 
Johnson offers a template of prosecutorial systems for both the United States and Japan, 
serving as a starting point for comparing the two systems. For the United States, prosecution 
includes, very generally, these stages:
1. An arrest
2. The prosecutor makes an initial charge decision
3. The accused is brought before a judge or magistrate for arraignment, and is shown the 
charge, bail is determined, and counsel is identified or appointed
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4. Probable cause is determined through a preliminary hearing or grand jury
5. Guilt or innocence is determined through a trial, or plea, or dismissal
6. Sentence is imposed.28
This is then contrasted with the Japanese prosecutorial model:
1. The initiation of cases: generally the police do not initiate by arrest; rather they consult 
with the prosecutor, and the overwhelming majority of cases are submitted to prosecutors 
without there being an arrest.  Johnson states that “police arrest fewer than 20 percent of all 
suspected Penal Code violators.”29
2. Once a suspect is arrested, police have forty-eight hours to transfer the suspect and 
case to prosecutors; but if the suspect is not arrested the investigator (and the prosecutor) have no 
formal time constraints.
3. Pre-charge detention and interrogation: According to Johnson, “If prosecutors believe 
a suspect should be detained further, they must ask a judge, within twenty-four hours of 
receiving the case, to approve up to ten days of additional detention. They may later ask for 
another ten-day extension. Judges rarely reject these requests for detention. In all, police and 
prosecutors can detain a suspect for up to twenty days afterwards (twenty-five days for crimes 
such as insurrection). During the pre-charge period, interrogations are long, thorough, and 
intense. Police and prosecutors routinely interrogate suspects several times for hours each 
time.”30
4. The prosecutor then makes the decision to charge or not charge. There 
are no “probable cause” hearings, no arraignments, and the accused has no right to be advised by 
an attorney nor any right to bail until the prosecutor makes the charging decision.
5. Serious cases are then formally prosecuted and tried in either a district or summary 
court; most minor offenses are prosecuted in summary courts upon the consent of the accused.
6. A one-phase trial is conducted, consisting of one or three judges, where the judges 
announce a verdict and impose a sentence in the same proceeding. Except for Okinawa, there are 
no juries, and 94 percent of the cases are brought before the court for trial within six months. 
Although adversarial in design, most trials include the defendant’s confession. Unlike in the 
United States, prosecutors can appeal an acquittal, and any other decision by the trial court.31
As Johnson notes, the “monopoly power to charge” possessed by prosecutors in Japan is 
a significant difference when compared to the sharing of power found in the United States, and 
“concentrates more charging power in the prosecutor in Japan than in almost any other 
democratic country.”32   Also significant is the power to detain and interrogate suspects for 
substantial periods of time, the power to use a number of tools designed to compel confessions, 
and the power to introduce at trial the fruits of detentions and interrogations.33
B. The Imbalance of Power Between Prosecutor and Judge
As Johnson notes in introducing the topic of prosecutors and judges, the judiciary in pre-
war Japan was not independent nor a separate branch of government, but was instead a “‘semi-
independent’ organ in the Ministry of Justice,” and the Ministry of Justice was (and is today) run 
by prosecutors, “who ‘controlled all budgetary and administrative matters of the judiciary, 
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including the appointment, promotion, transfer, supervision, and dismissal of judges and court 
officials.’”34  Postwar changes to the structure, according to Johnson, gave judges independence 
and power they did not have prior to the war, but “judges seldom use their newfound powers to 
check prosecutor behavior. Whether during investigation, at trial, or concerning the charge 
decision, prosecutors get what they want from judges with notably few exceptions.”35
Telling in the relationship between judges and prosecutors in Japan, is the role of judges 
in pre-charge events. As noted, there is no right to bail nor access to counsel until the prosecutor 
charges an accused, and by that time the accused may have been detained and repeatedly 
interrogated for over three weeks. Court involvement is required for such a detention, but 
according to Johnson, courts overwhelmingly support requests for precharge detention, rejecting 
the detention request only one in every 705 requests (in 1992 prosecutors requested 77,545 
investigative detentions, and judges refused in only 110 cases).36   Similarly, prosecutors can rely 
on nearly complete support by judges with respect to bail.  No bail is available until after the 
prosecutor charges the accused, and the court solicits input from the prosecutor seeking what is 
in effect confirmation that the accused has confessed and the prosecutor’s conclusion that the 
defendant will abide by his or her confession during trial. “Suspects who insist on their 
innocence stand only a tiny chance of being released.37  Simply put, suspects who do not confess 
do not get bail.”38
C. Abuse in the Prosecutorial Functions: Confessions, Brutality, and 
Secrecy
Consistently sounded themes in comparisons between prosecutorial systems in Japan and 
the United States include assessments of the role of confessions, the use of prosecutorial 
intimidation to obtain those confessions, and the absence of media attention in pre-charge 
criminal proceedings. Johnson refers to confessions as “the heart” of Japanese criminal justice.39
Prosecutors in Japan work in an environment driven by confessions, one that considers 
confessions to be a paramount goal of all prosecutions.40  Where prosecutors in the United States 
may have become inured to the use of plea bargains as a means of effective docket control, 
Japanese prosecutors extract their key prosecutorial weapon before the charge is made, during 
interrogation and outside the reach of public scrutiny. 
Also beyond public scrutiny is the process of procuring these confessions. Media 
accounts and Johnson’s own experiences while in Japan reinforce the logical notion that when 
hidden from public view, the process of extracting confessions may readily tolerate physical and 
mental abuse by the interrogators. In one study by the Tokyo Bar Association and described by 
Johnson, thirty-three former suspects had given false confessions, admitting to crimes they had 
not committed. On average, according to the study, “suspects in this study were interrogated for 
sixty-two days, and even the median suspect was interrogated for forty-four days. The longest 
day of interrogation per suspect averaged thirteen hours. Assuming that a typical day of 
interrogation lasted three hours instead of thirteen – a conservative conjecture indeed – the 
median suspect was interrogated for 132 hours. . . .”  By comparison, one recent estimate of 
interrogation practices in the United States found that “92 percent of suspects were interrogated 
for two hours or less.”41  Further, during the interrogations, the suspects reported repeatedly 
Page 11 of  15
being slapped, kicked, punched or otherwise beaten by interrogators.42  In one instance reported 
directly by Johnson based on his field interviews in Japan, more than one prosecutor 
acknowledged forcing suspects to stand on their heads, ‘to get more blood flowing into the brains 
of people who are not thinking clearly.”43
One of the significant concerns raised by Johnson in his description of the process of 
extracting confessions in Japan is the complacency of the media. In a representative comment, 
Johnson quotes a journalist as saying that “in Japan, writing critical investigative articles is not a 
press custom. We know there are areas where we better not tread. . . . We don’t make bold 
criticisms because if we did, we’d be shut off from information and unable to perform our jobs. . 
. . We have struck a kind of bargain: prosecutors give us information, and we given them good 
[uncritical] coverage. Of course, prosecutors don’t say directly that if we write so-and-so we’ll 
get shut out of the loop, but everyone understands the deal. Prosecutors are our superiors and we 
are their supplicants. We have to be humble and play by their rules.”44
IV. Application of the Lessons
A. The Consequence of Secrecy
Justice Kennedy’s exhortation that members of the legal community resist mandatory
minimum sentence schemes is based, it appears, on a recognition that certain responsibilities in 
the criminal justice system cannot be delegated to the executive branch without a significant risk 
of loss of fundamental fairness. Courts act in a very public way, facing the victims, the accused, 
the press, and the legal community, all in stark contrast to the decision making process employed 
by prosecutors when deciding what charges to press against a suspect. Legislative action like that 
which is found in the USA Patriot Act and other post-9/11 legislation gravitates consistently 
towards sealing off critical parts of the criminal justice system from public scrutiny and judicial 
oversight. Secrecy of the proceedings is a baldly accepted goal of this legislation, and should be 
regarded with great caution.
As Michael T. McCarthy expressed the point, secrecy blocks the very tools needed for 
maintaining checks and balances over governmental excesses: 
One significant hurdle to effective oversight of how the executive 
branch uses its new powers is secrecy. [fn omitted] The more 
politically accountable branch provides an effective check on 
executive authority only when the legislature is responsive to 
citizen concerns, which depends on abuses of discretion being 
discovered. There can be no public outcry and congressional 
pressure over abuse of secret [Foreign Intelligence Standards Act] 
warrants if targets are unaware of the surveillance; there can be no 
habeas corpus proceedings for immigrants secretly detained. Since 
voters and attorneys will be unable to raise abuses of secret 
procedures, Congress and the courts must be aggressive in acting 
sua sponte to monitor how the powers granted by the USA Patriot 
Act are being used.”45
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Courts and all in the legal community have an obligation to ensure sufficient judicial 
oversight exists to provide at least minimum safeguards against the abuse of persons and the 
abuse of power by prosecutors and investigators. Secrecy is a powerful tool, one that 
traditionally has been 
kept in fairly close check by courts. The events of September 11 have not weakened the need for 
control over the excesses of our government over the governed.
B. The Consequence of Enhanced Prosecutorial Discretion
A key cultural difference noted by Johnson in his examination of prosecutorial culture in 
Japan is its reliance on a hierarchical review of prosecutorial decision making. Johnson credits 
close internal controls and collaborative decision making between prosecutors and his or her 
supervisors as likely reasons for that country’s high conviction rate. “Managers in Japan further 
specify rules for performance by requiring operators to clear decisions with supervisors, chiefly 
through the kessai system of consultation and approval. In order to make charge and sentence 
recommendation decisions, operators must consult with and obtain the approval of two or three 
managers, depending on the seriousness of the case.”46  In practical terms, close vetting of 
charges before actually filing of charges reduces the risk of erroneous criminal prosecution. If 
the team effectively tests the relative strengths and weaknesses of a case, the process will reduce 
the likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. There are few acquittals in Japanese criminal trials 
because, as Johnson puts it, “prosecutors have already ‘acquitted’ suspects who might have been 
acquitted at trial.”47
There is no comparable system in the United States, designed to thoroughly screen cases 
so as to reject cases in a manner similar to that used in Japan. To the extent post-9/11 legislation 
expands prosecutorial authority without engendering some concomitant level of accountability 
and efficacy like the kessai system of internal checks on prosecutorial discretion, there is a 
substantial risk that prosecutors will abuse their increased authority, all in the name of national 
security. This should be a cause for some concern. As one commentator put it:
Ultimately, the debate over the USA Patriot Act is just as much 
about the delegation of executive authority as it is about civil 
liberties. If the Administration exercises its new authorities with 
respect for civil liberties, and Congress provides appropriate 
oversight to prove that this has been the case, then the USA Patriot 
Act will have been a wise and timely piece of legislation in a 
national crisis. If the Administration fails to use restraint, and 
Congress and the courts let down their guard, however, the USA 
Patriot Act could become another chapter in America’s history of 
suspending Constitutional values during difficult times.”48
V. Conclusion
Justice Kennedy’s call to the legal profession to show a collective concern against 
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sentencing legislation that deprives courts of discretion is a call not based on constitutional 
concepts as much as it is based on public policy. As we know from the Court’s review of 
mandatory minimum sentences and “three strikes” sentencing schemes, our constitution tolerates 
such schemes, at least as construed by the majority of the current Supreme Court.49 And so too it 
may be that the enhanced prosecutorial powers created under the USA Patriot Act and other 
legislation enacted in response to the attacks of September 11 will ultimately pass judicial 
muster. For reasons similar to those expressed by Justice Kennedy, however, legislation that 
shifts power from courts to prosecutors must be viewed with substantial and close scrutiny. 
Much can be learned from a prosecutorial scheme that bestows the depth of authority 
shown in Japan, if for no reason other than the fact that so much power is given to the prosecutor 
prior to the time charges are made against an accused. Clearly the present Administration would 
have its Attorney General have at least as broad a set of powers as is currently in place in Japan. 
Should such a shift of power become a reality, indeed if it already done so, it would seem 
incumbent upon all judges and lawyers to monitor such a shift in power closely indeed.
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